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Large IT programmes rarely fail for technical reasons alone. They fail when the people accountable for them cannot see what is happening, cannot tell competence from confidence, and learn the truth too late. This work is about seeing clearly, early enough to act.
Boards, chief executives, programme sponsors and senior public servants who are accountable for a major IT or transformation programme they did not build and cannot inspect directly. Also legal and audit teams asked to advise a sponsor while a programme is still live.
An engagement is scoped to the decision you have to make. Typical forms:
A written assessment in language the board can act on, with findings tied to documents and interviews; a clear statement of the risks and the decision options; and, where wanted, continuing sponsor advice through the next decision points. I do not run programmes on your behalf; I help the people accountable for them govern them.
This work rests on Dr Carlton's doctoral research into why large-scale IT projects fail, based on a very large public-sector programme, 181 interviews and thousands of pages of project records. Two findings recur in practice: leadership that lacks domain expertise cannot tell competent delivery from confident delivery, and governance structures built on formal method do not compensate for that gap. The published papers are below.
A workbook that turns AI governance from a compliance burden into a delivery discipline: mapping an organisation against an AI technical standard, an implementation methodology, procurement and contract governance, and oversight across the AI lifecycle.
Cybersecurity explained for boards and executives: how the threat landscape evolved, what compliance requires, how threats differ from vulnerabilities, and what an informed executive response looks like.
Why do IT projects still fail when the causes are well known? Using multi-grounded theory on a major Australian IT project, this paper examines the lack of domain expertise among senior management and vendor representatives, and reads the decisions of the people involved through the Kruger-Dunning effect.
A qualitative study of a large public-sector IT project whose cost overrun exceeded AUD 1 billion, drawing on 181 interviews and 5,000 pages of project data. It develops a theory of situational incompetence and proposes an instrument for gauging leadership competence as project size and complexity grow.
What government agencies should weigh before investing in AI, and how public-sector project governance shapes the outcome.
Whether AI projects will repeat the failure patterns of large IT projects, and what governance would have to look like to prevent it.
No. The work is independent advice to the sponsor and the board. It complements internal assurance and can be structured to work alongside an existing programme office or audit function.
Yes. The assessment looks at the delivery organisation as a whole, client side and supplier side, and at the contract and governance that connect them. Findings are evidence-based and stated in a form that both sides can test.
It depends on the size of the programme and the decision it must inform. Scope, access and timing are agreed at the start, and a preliminary view is usually possible early where a decision is urgent.
Then that is the finding, with the evidence and the alternatives set out. The purpose of independent assessment is to give the sponsor an honest picture in time to act on it.